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a penalty was held not to violate the constitutional guaranty against
double jeopardy. The Court ruled that the double damages and the
penalty were imposed merely to compensate the government for the
damage done by the violations of the act, i.e., the penalties were
remedial, not penal.
From the above discussion, it may be seen that the only cases
which hold the privilege against self-incrimination applicable where
the witness may be subject to "penalties" by way of payment of
money are those in which the courts feel that the "penalty" is not
remedial, but criminally penal; ones where the damages sought are
imposed as a criminal penalty or substitute therefore, and not where
they are intended to compensate private aggrievances. Admittedly,
punitive damages are "penal," as the court in Allred stresses ;" also
it is true that the defendants might become subject to body execution
upon failure to pay the judgment for such damages. It is sub-
mitted, however, that the damages are not penal within the concept
of "criminal prosecution," even though the defendants, in further-
ance of their civil liability, might be jailed by means of body execu-
tion, and that the court erred by overlooking the distinction between
merely "penal" damages which are in essence merely a further civil
liability, and "penal" damages which come within the concept of
"criminal prosecution," to which the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion extends only.
ARCH K. SciiocHr IV
Constitutional Law-Was it Intended That the Fourteenth Amend-
ment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?
The Supreme Court in 1833 established the principle that the
Bill of Rights did not apply to the states.1 Following the Civil War
the fourteenth amendment, with its "privileges or immunities" and
"due process" clauses, cast doubt on this principle and raised the
possibility of applying the Bill of Rights to the states by incor-
porating them into the amendment.'
53 261 N.C. at 35, 134 S.E.2d at 190.
'Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, provides: "All persons born or naturalized
in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of
the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
19641
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The Court early held in the Slaughter House Cases' that the
"privileges or immunities" clause prevented the states from abridging
those privileges or immunities that a person holds due to his United
States citizenship, but not those privileges or immunities he might
hold due to state citizenship. Thus, the decision in effect nullified the
importance of this clause for purposes of incorporation.
4
The "due process" clause, however, has not been construed so
strictly. Instead, it has been utilized many times, particularly
recently, to make certain parts of the Bill of Rights applicable to the
states.5 The majority position of the Court has achieved this result
by a selective process of incorporating into the fourteenth amend-
ment only those parts of the Bill of Rights the violation of which
would also violate "those fundamental principles of liberty and
justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions."0
Under this process, the Court has clearly incorporated freedom of
religion,7 of speech,8 of press,9 and of assembly;"" protection from
unreasonable searches and seizures;" requirements of just com-
pensation for property; assistance of counsel;1 protection from
cruel and unusual punishments ;14 and the privilege against self-
incrimination. 14a
A minority position, led by Justice Black, contends that any act
in violation of the Bill of Rights also violates the fourteenth
amendment.:5 Justice Black bases this conclusion on his belief that
the framers of the fourteenth amendment intended that the Bill of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
883 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
'CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 187 (10th
ed. 1948).5 E.g., Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961).
'it. re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 448 (1890). This basic idea was earlier
stated in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S.
(18 How.) 272, 277 (1856).
'Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
'Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
9 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
10 De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
"Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
"~aMalloy v. Hogan, 32 U.S.L. WEEK 4507 (U.S. June 15, 1964).
"5 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (dissenting opinion).
Dissenting with Justice Black were justices Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge.
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Rights be applicable to the states."8 Legal scholars differ on this
question of intent.'7  The purposes of this note are, first, to study
the events pertinent to the passage of the amendment in order to
determine the intent behind its passage, and, second, to discuss the
influence which this intent should have on present Supreme Court
decisions.
When the new Congress convened after the Civil War, the Con-
stitution had been construed so as to give little protection against
state action.'8 Barron v. Baltimore9 had limited the effect of the
Bill of Rights to the federal government, and the Dred Scott2"
decision had eliminated any possibility of the "privileges and im-
munities" clause of article IV, section 2 being used to protect the
Negro. Since these decisions gave the Negro little protection against
the "Black Codes"'" passed by many southern states, the new Con-
"* Justice Black states: "My study of the historical events that culminated
in the Fourteenth Amendment... persuades me that one of the chief objects
that the provisions of the Amendment's first section, separately, and as a
whole, were intended to accomplish was to make the Bill of Rights applicable
to the states." Id. at 71.
'" Favoring the intent-to-incorporate theory are: FLACK, THE ADOPTION
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1908) [hereinafter cited as FLAcK];
GUTHRIE, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES (1898). Opposing this theory are: Fairman, Does the
Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. Rv. 5
(1949) [hereinafter cited as Fairman]; Graham, Our "Declaratory" Four-
teenth Amendment, 7 STAN. L. Rxv. 3 (1954).
Many writers contend that the fourteenth amendment was intended to
greatly expand the federal power, but they make no mention of a specific
intent to incorporate the Bill of Rights. COLwLNS, THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT AND THE STATES (1912); CORWiN, THE CONSTITUTION AND
WHAT IT MEANS TODAY (10th ed. 1948); 2 WA.RE, THE SUPREmE COURT
IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (1926); Royal, The Fourteenth Amendment:
The Slaughter House Cases, 4 So. L. Rlv. 558 (1879).
8 Prior to the Civil War three decisions had severly limited federal
control over state action. First, in Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546
(No. 3230) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823), Justice Washington adopted a limited
construction of the original "privileges and immunities" clause in article IV,
section 2, so that each state was required to give only the fundamental
rights to citizens of other states. Next, in 1833, the Court in the landmark
case of Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), held that the
Bill of Rights did not apply to the states. Finally, in Scott v. Sanford, 60
U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), the Court again limited the scope of the
"privileges and immunities" clause of article IV, section 2, so that what
coverage remained after Corfield did not apply to protect the Negro.
" Supra, note 18.
:0 Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
21 For a general comparison of these laws see Message of the President
of the United States to the House of Representatives, Freedmen, H.R. Doc.
No. 118, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1886).
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gress immediately sought to pass remedial legislation.22
The Civil Rights Act of 186623 was the first product. Although
it finally passed the Act over President Johnson's veto,24 Congress
itself was uncertain of its constitutional power to pass such a
measure.25 Thus, in order to assure constitutionality, the 39th
Congress began work on a constitutional amendment.20  The job of
drafting what was to become the fourteenth amendment was given
to the Joint Committee on Reconstruction. The first proposal from
the Committee was drafted by Representative Bingham ;27 and, like
the Civil Rights Act, the apparent purpose was to protect the Negro
from discrimination by the southern states.28 Up to this time there
had been no proposals, bills or discussion which could possibly be
construed as an attempt or desire to apply the Bill of Rights to the
states via the new amendment. Before this first draft was perma-
nently pigeonholed, however, it gave rise to some ambiguous dis-
cussion.
On February 26, 1866, Representative Bingham, in an opening
speech to the House, outlined his conception of the problem :29 al-
though every word of the proposed amendment was already in the
Constitution, Congress had heretofore lacked the power of enforce-
ment.30 He further declared that if Congress had previously had
this power and had been able to exercise it, there would have been.
" HICKS & MOWRY, A SHORT HISTORY OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 339
(2d ed. 1956).
23 Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866). This bill provided that persons born in the
United States under United States jurisdiction were citizens of the United
States, and without regard to color, were entitled in every state and territory
to the same right to contract, sue, give evidence, and take, hold and convey
property, and to the equal benefit of all laws for security of person and
property, as was enjoyed by white citizens.
In his opening speech to the Senate, Senator Trumbull clearly expressed
that the purpose of the Act was to prevent discrimination in civil rights on
account of race and to give all persons equal protection of the laws. CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1865-1866).
2,Id. at 1809.
"Id. at 1151.
2" Id. at 2459.
2
7 Id. at 806.
" This proposal provided: "The Congress shall have power to make all
laws which shall be necessary and proper to secure to the citizens of each
State all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States; and to
all persons in the several States equal protection in the rights of life, liberty,
and property." Ibid.
"Id. at 1033.
"Id. at 1034. The proposed amendment was nothing more than a reitera-
tion of article IV, section 2, and the fifth amendment. See note 28 supra.
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no rebellion. ' Bingham then concluded that the purpose of the new
amendment was to give Congress power to enforce "this immortal
bill of rights" upon the states. 2 Use of this phrase has given rise
to conflicting interpretations as to what was intended by "bill of
rights.1
3 3
After Bingham's opening speech to the House, there were no
more references to the "bill of rights" until his closing speech, where
he stated that the purpose of the proposed amendment was to arm
Congress with the power to enforce the Bill of Rights against the
states.3 '4 He then stated:
Gentlemen, admit the force of the provisions in the bill of rights,
that the citizens of the United States shall be entitled to all the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States in the
several States, and that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law....85
Shortly after Representative Bingham's closing speech, con-
sideration of this draft was permanently pigeonholed. 6  How-
ever, the Joint Committee on Reconstruction immediately framed.
a new draft which was to become, after the Senate's definition of
CoNG. GLOBE, op. cit. supra note 23, at 1034.
In part, Bingham's words were: "And, sir, it is equally clear by every
construction of the Constitution, ... that these great provisions of the
Constitution, this immortal bill of rights embodied in the Constitution, rested
for its execution and enforcement hitherto upon the fidelity of the States."
Ibid.
" Fairman contends that "this immortal bill of rights" is to Bingham a
"fine literary phrase not referring precisely to the first eight amendments."
He argues that Bingham was referring to "the privileges or immunities"
of article IV, section 2, and to the right of life, liberty, and property of the
fifth amendment. He reasons further that if Bingham had intended to
include the first eight amendments, this would have been inconsistent with
his statement that had Congress had and exercised this power there would
have been no rebellion, for enforcement of the first amendment would not
have prevented secession. Fairman 44. On the other hand, Flack interprets
Bingham's language more literally, contending that "it meant nothing less
than the conferring upon Congress the power to enforce, in every State of the
Union, the Bill of Rights, as found in the first eight Amendments." FLAcK
57.
,CONG. GLOBE, op. cit. supra note 23, at 1088.
"Id. at 1089. Fairman again believes that Bingham did not mean "the
first eight amendments" when he used the phrase "bill of rights," contending
that, in this statement, Bingham made it clear from the context that he was
referring to the fundamental freedoms of the "due process" and "privileges
or immunities" clause. Fairman 34. Flack does not analyze the speech
in detail but simply says that Bingham stated that the purpose of the amend-
ment was to give Congress power to enforce the Bill of Rights. FLAcK 59.
" CONG. GLOBE, op. cit. supra note 23, at 1095.
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a citizen was added,"7 the final version of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Thaddeus Stevens introduced this new draft into the House
on May 8, 1866,38 stating that he felt the purpose of the amend-
ment was to give Congress power to correct the unjust legislation
of the states.3 9 He further expressed his belief that equal pro-
tection, designed to cure the evil of discrimination, was the domi-
nant purpose of section 1.40 Stevens reasoned that while the Civil
Rights Bill secured the same protection, an amendment would
prevent repeal of the protection by a simple majority of Congress.4"
During the last day of the House debate, Represerntative
Bingham added his reasons for giving Congress power to enforce
the Constitution against the states,42 stating: "Contrary to the ex-
press letter of your Constitution, cruel and unusual punishments
have been inflicted under state laws within the Union upon your
citizens.... ,
After passage of the amendment in the House,44 Senator
Howard introduced the proposal into the Senate.45  His introductory
speech furnishes the strongest evidence that Congress intended to
incorporate the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amendment. In
defining the privileges and immunities to be covered by the amend-
ment, Senator Howard quoted from Corfield v. Coryell," which had
defined them as being those privileges and immunities which are in
their nature fundamental. 7 In furtherance of this definition, he
stated: "To these privileges and immunities.., should be added the
37 Id. at 2897.
18 Id. at 2459.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
" Ibid. Fairman utilizes Representative Stevens' speech to substantiate
the position that no incorporation was intended, noting that over and over
in the discussion, the correlation between section 1 and the Civil Rights Act is
mentioned, and that since no one intended for the Civil Rights Act to in-
corporate the Bill of Rights, no one intended that the amendment do so.
Fairman 44.
"'Id. at 2542.
"'Ibid. Flack relies on Bingham's reference to "cruel and unusual
punishments" as further evidence that the Bill of Rights was intended to be
incorporated. FLAcK 79-80. Fairman answers this by contending that
Bingham was only arguing in favor of a selective incorporation process by
means of the "due process" clause. Fairman 53.
" CONG. GLoBE, op. cit. supra note 23, at 2545. This was done only after
three days debate, the vote being 128 for and 37 against. Ibid.
,Id. at 2765.
"6 Fed. Cas. 546 (No. 3230) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
17 Id. at 551-52.
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personal rights guaranteed and secured by the first eight amend-
ments to the Constitution .. ,,4s Senator Howard then proceeded
to read each of the first eight amendments,4 9 stating that there was
no power in the Constitution for Congress to enforce them, and that
the purpose of the proposed amendment was to give Congress such
power.5"
After passage by the Senate,51 the amendment was submitted to
the states on June 16, 1866,52 and was adopted two years later.53
There was practically no discussion in the state legislatures of the
conflict that the first eight amendments might have with their present
state laws.54 To this there was one notable exception. In. the Massa-
chusetts House the proposed amendment received an unfavorable
report from its Committee on Federal Relations.5 5 The Committee
considered section 1 of the fourteenth amendment to be surplusage,
stating that it did not see where this section differed from article IV,
CONG. GLOBE, op. cit. supra note 23, at 2765.
"Ibid.
Id. at 2766. Flack points out that Howard's interpretation of the
amendment was not questioned by anyone, and that since no member of the
Committee gave a different interpretation or questioned his statement, his
interpretation must be accepted as that of the Committee. FLACK 87. The
opposing view agrees that what is said by a member for a reporting com-
mittee is ordinarily entitled to very special consideration, "but others may,
without challenging those views, have supported the measure for quite
inconsistent reasons." Fairman 66. It should also be noted in this context
that the minority opposed the amendment for the very reasons that Howard
gave in support of it. FL-ACK 87.
Fairman points out the repetition in incorporating the "due process" clause
of the fifth amendment and also restating it in the fourteenth. Fairman 58.
It would appear that this contention is somewhat irrelevant. It is true that
Congress would be repeating itself by including two "due process" clauses,
but this does not explain away Howard's belief that the fourteenth amend-
ment included the Bill of Rights.
" CONG. GLOBE, op. cit. supra note 23, at 3042. This was done on June 8,
1866, the vote being 33 for, 11 against, with 5 absent. Ibid.
:2 FLACK 140.
,' FLACK 191 n.117.
' Fairman 82. Professor Fairman points to several of the state laws
which would conflict with the fourteenth amendment as evidence that the
states did not intend to incorporate. He notes further that several states
(Connecticut, Kansas, and Michigan) did not require that a person charged
with "a capital or otherwise infamous crime" be indicted by a grand jury
as is required by the fifth amendment. Yet, says Fairman, there was no
suggestion by their legislatures that their state law conflicted with the fifth
amendment.
Fairman also noted that New Hampshire's Constitution made provision
for the support and maintenance of Protestant ministers, yet no question of
the first amendment's provision for freedom of religion was discussed by
the legislature.
" H.R. Doc. No. 149, 1, 25 (Mass. 1867).
1964]
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section 2, and amendments I, II, V, and VIII." During the period
in which the question of ratification was before the state legislatures,
there were no statements in the newspapers as to whether the first
eight amendments were to be applicable to the states.
57
Less than a year after the states had adopted the fourteenth
amendment, the Supreme Court in Twitchell v. Pennsylvania"' re-
fused to consider whether the fifth and sixth amendments applied to
the states. Citing Barron, Chief Justice Case spoke for an unanimous
court in refusing to take jurisdiction by writ of error, stating that ap-
plication of the fifth and sixth amendments to the states was "no
longer a subject of discussion. ' 59
Two years later, in 1871, the question arose in the House as to
whether the "privileges or immunities" clause of the fourteenth
amendment was intended to incorporate the Bill of Rights. 0 During
this debate Representative Bingham read each of the first eight
amendments and stated that the "privileges or immunities" clause
"0Ibid. Professor Flack states that this Committee report is valuable
because it shows that the legislature, in adopting the report, "accepted the
statements made in it that the first section was but a reiteration of the
guarantees enumerated in the Amendments." FLACK 188.
Professor Fairman points out that the Committee was completely wrong
in believing that the Bill of Rights applied to the states, citing Barron.
Fairman 120. This explanation appears irrelevant for there is no significance
in the fact that the Committee was unaware of this decision. What is im-
portant is that the Committee thought that the fourteenth amendment included
some of the Bill of Rights.
"' FLACK 153. Flack states that, "it may be inferred that this was recog-
nized to be the logical result by those who thought that the freedom of speech
and of the press as well as due process of law, including jury trial, were
secured by it." Id. at 153-54.
Professor Fairman points out that it may be equally inferred that these
persons suggested a "selective" incorporation of certain freedoms expressed
in the Bill of Rights. Fairman 81.
5874 U.S. (7 Wall.) 321 (1869). The petitioner had been sentenced to
death for murder. In seeking a writ of error it was contended that he had
not been indicted by a grand jury, which was in violation of the fifth
amendment, and that he had not been informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation, which was in violation of the sixth amendment. The four-
teenth amendment now guarantees the protection of the fifth amendment's
privilege against self-incrimination. Malloy v. Hogan, 32 U.S.L. WEEK
4507 (U.S. June 15, 1964).
5974 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 325. This case is cited as showing that the
fourteenth amendment was not intended to incorporate the Bill of Rights.
Fairman 132. Part of what was "no longer a subject of discussion" in
Twitchell is now. See Malloy v. Hogan, supra note 58.
"0 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 111-18 (1871). The fact that this
question was debated within five years after passage is an indication of the
conflicting intentions within Congress.
[Vol. 42
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made them an express prohibition upon every state.6' It would seem
that this speech by Bingham is conclusive evidence that he intended
the Bill of Rights to be incorporated.
2
Reviewing the Congressional debate, the state legislative dis-
cussion, and the general public response, it can be seen that the
evidence in favor of the intent-to-incorporate theory consists of
Representative Bingham's speeches in the House, Senator Howard's
introductory speech in the Senate, and the Committee Report in the
Massachusetts legislature. On the other hand, the evidence opposed
to the intent-to-incorporate theory consists of the total lack of
newspaper discussion about incorporation, the lack of discussion in
the state legislatures (except Massachusetts), and of the Supreme
Court decision in Twitchell. Note that the evidence in favor of the
intent to incorporate theory is found entirely within the congressional
debates, while the evidence opposed is found entirely outside of the
debates. Thus, the conclusion follows that Congress intended in-
corporation, while the states and the general public did not.63 How-
ever, the above conclusion raises the additional problem: how could
the states blindly ratify an amendment not knowing its actual intent?
The post-Civil War atmosphere, which is difficult for us to compre-
hend today, supplies the answer. It would appear that the framers
desired a strong amendment limiting states' rights and including
the Bill of Rights."- Yet they saw that sufficient support in Con-
gress did not necessarily mean sufficient support by the states. 5
61 After reading the Bill of Rights, one by one, Bingham said, "These
eight articles... never were a limitation upon the power of the State, until
made so by the Fourteenth Amendment. The words of that Amendment
'no State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States' are an express prohibition upon
every State." Id. at 115.
" Thus, Professor Fairman's contention that Bingham was using the
term "bill of rights" as a fine literary phrase becomes more difficult to accept.
See note 33 supra.
' 2 WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 53941
(1926); Green, The Bill of Rights, The Fourteenth Amendment and the
Supreme Court, 46 MIcH. L. REv. 869, 904 (1948); Note, Purpose and
Scope of the Fourteenth Amendment, 21 So. CAL. L. REv. 47, 53 (1947);
Note, The Fourteenth Amendment Challenged, 36 GEo. L.J. 398, 410 (1948).
o" COLLINS, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE STATES 10 (1912);
FLACK 94; GUTHRIE, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES 60-61 (1898); The Fourteenth Amendment Chal-
lenged, supra note 63, at 405; Note, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 33 IowA L. REv. 666, 667 (1948).
as COLLINS, op. cit. supra note 64, at 10; The Fourteenth Amendment
Challenged, supra note 63, at 405; The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment, supra note 64, at 667.
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Therefore, the framers resorted to broad language that was accepted
by the House after only three days of discussion and by the Senate
after five days of discussion and that was ratified during the post-
Civil War hate-the-South-and-help-the-Negro period. 6 In addition,
the attention of the general population and their representatives was
focused on punishing the South and finding some way to protect
the newly freed Negro from the "Black Codes." 7 This explains
why most of the discussion in Congress centered around the effects
the new amendment would have on the Negro. Congress and the
states no doubt thought that passing the amendment would give
Congress power to carry out a program of reconstruction and that
use of this power would focus naturally against the southern states0"
Moreover, ratification was achieved by requiring the southern states
to ratify before being re-admitted to the Union."
The conflicting intentions of Congress and of the states raise
the constructional problem of whose intent will be given the greater
weight.7" In Maxwell v. Dow71 the Supreme Court stated that in
the case of an ambiguous constitutional amendment the Court
should not only evaluate Congress's intention but should also look
to the ratifying states' intentions. In the case of an ambiguous
amendment it would appear that since an amendment has no effect
until ratified by the states, it should be given no broader construction
than the states intended. 2 Thus, it follows that the fourteenth
amendment was not intended to incorporate the Bill of Rights.
But, assuming that the intent-to-incorporate theory might be cor-
rect, an additional problem needs clarifying: which particular clause
incorporates the Bill of Rights? Either the "privileges or immuni-
" COLLINS, op. cit. supra note 64, at 10-12; 2 WAxmmN, op. cit. supra
note 63, at 539-40; The Fourteenth Amendment Challenged, supra note 63,
at 405; The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 64,
at 667.
"' COLLINS, op. cit. supra note 64, at 9; 2 WAamN, op. cit. supra note 63,
at 540; Corwin, The Supreme Court and the Fourteenth Amendment, 7
MicH. L. REv. 643, 645 (1908).
" COLLINS, op. cit. supra note 64, at 10; FLACK 94.
" COLLINS, op. cit. supra note 64, at 142; The Bill of Rights and the
Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 64, at 667.
"0 This problem assumes that "intent" should be considered in interpreting
a law. See tenBroek, Use by The United States Supreme Court of Extrinsic
Aids in Constitutional Construction, 26 CAL. L. Rnv. 437 (1938), for reasons
for rejecting the "intent" theory.
' 176 U.S. 581, 602 (1900).
" tenBroek, supra note 70, at 453; IV Worthington, Letters and Other
Writings of James Madison 211 (1884).
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ties" clause or the "due process" clause may be relied upon to sup-
port the incorporation theory.73 Three reasons favor incorporation
through the "privileges or immunities" clause.
First, all the evidence (the speeches of Bingham and Howard
and the Massachusetts Committee Report) in support of the in-
corporation theory pointed toward incorporation through the "privi-
leges or immunities" clause, not the "due process" clause. Both
Howard in his Senate address' and the Massachusetts Committee
Report75 stated that the privileges or immunities were those ex-
pressed in the first eight amendments. Also, Bingham said in his
explanation to the House in 1871 that he intended the "privileges
or immunities" clause to include the first eight amendments. 16  No
such statements were made about the "due process" clause.
Second, the "due process" clause of the fifth amendment had been
recently (1856) and clearly defined in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken
Land & Improvement Co.17 There the Supreme Court held that
an act was not due process if it violated "those settled usages and
modes of proceeding existing in the common and statute law of
England . ,, "74 This decision supports the natural law construc-
tion of the majority of the Court but not the full incorporation theory
advocated by Black.
Third, the natural reading of the "privileges or immunities"
clause in conjunction with the "citizenship" clause supports the in-
corporation theory.79 Thus, incorporation must take place, if at all,
through the "privileges or immunities" clause.s0
Even if the intent-to-incorporate theory is correct, it does not
" Justice Black does not take a position on the question. See note 17
supra.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1865-1866).
' H. R. Doc. No. 149, 1, 25 (Mass. 1867).
° CONG. GLOBE, supra note 60, at 115.
759 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).
°Id. at 277.
"'Justice Black in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 76 (1947), agrees
with this natural reading and favorably quotes Professor Royal who stated
in The Fourteenth Amendment: The Slaughter-House Cases, 4 So. L. REv.
558 (1870), "Ninety-nine out of every one hundred educated men, upon
reading this section over, would at first say that it forbade a State to make
or enforce a law which abridged any privilege or immunity whatever of one
who was a citizen of the United States." Id. at 563.
.. GUTHRIE, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES 60-61 (1898); Purpose and Scope of the Fourteenth
Amendment, supra note 63, at 57; The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment, supra note 64, at 668.
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necessarily follow that the Supreme Court should today incorporate
the Bill of Rights. Rather, stare decisis and the social pressures to
incorporate should be considered.
The social pressures to incorporate have been held to a minimum
by the "due process" clause. In order to insure justice, the Supreme
Court has not needed to incorporate the Bill of Rights in its en-
tirety.81 Instead, the Court, relying on the due process clause,
need only find that the state action violates "those fundamental
principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil
and political institutions." 2
This selective process has the advantage of not requiring that
all of the first eight amendments be applied against the states.
83
Some of the amendments are no longer as necessary as they once
were. For example, the second amendment guaranteeing the right
to bear arms is not as important today as it once was. Also, the
seventh amendment's twenty dollar maximum limit on certain trials
without a jury is outdated due to inflation.
Thus, even if it be assumed that the fourteenth amendment was
intended to incorporate the Bill of Rights, respect for stare decisis,
plus lack of pressure to overrule past decisions are sufficient reasons
to reject Justice Black's incorporation theory8 4
FRANx H. WALKER, JR.
Federal Jurisdiction-Abstention-Right to Return to Federal Courts
The "abstention doctrine" is the name given to the principles
applied by the federal courts when they refuse to decide a case over
which they properly have jurisdiction,1 and leave the plaintiff with
the necessity of presenting part,' or all,3 of the questions in the
"' Green, supra note 63, at 906; Comment, The Adamson Case: A Study
in Constitutional Technique, 58 YALE L.J. 268, 287 (1949); The Bill of
Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 64, at 675." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
s" Green, supra note 89, at 906.
"' Purpose and Scope of the Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 89, at
47; A Study in Constitutiotul Technique, supra note 106, at 268; The Bill
of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 90.
' Abstention is a decision on the merits, one which comes after the
question of jurisdiction. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein,
370 U.S. 713 (1963) (per curiam) (implicit), 42 N.C.L. REv. 236 (1963).
'E.g., Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959); Railroad Comm'n v.
Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).3 E.g., Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341
(1951); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
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